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STICKS AND STONES: HOW WORDS
CAN HURT
Abstract: In 1969, in Bmndenbu?g u Ohio, the United States Supreme
Court held that speech tending to promote lawlessness or advocating
illegal activity cannot be restrained by criminal law unless the speech "is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action." The Brandenburgstandard, which applies
to the use of civil as well as criminal sanctions to regulate free speech,
reflects the Court's belief that the free competition of ideas, rather than
censorship, is the preferred means of eliminating "bad" ideas in the
public consciousness. Courts and constitutional scholars alike are in
discord over the appropriateness of the First Amendment's protective
veil, particularly when it functions to protect materials that instruct on
how to perform illegal or harmful activity and negligent publications
that contain misinformation, reliance upon which leads to injury. This
Note explores the various types of litigation private parties have used in
attempting to impose liability on speakers whose speech resulted in
such harm.
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press . Although this language seems apoclictic, since the
birth of this country, legislatures have passed statutes that abridge
both freedom of speech and the press; 2 and the United States Su-
preme Court has made clear that these freedoms are not absolute. 3
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The protections of the First Amendment have been incorpo-
rated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Thus, the First Amendment
also constrains State action abridging an individual's freedoms of speech and press. See,
e.g., id. at 666.
2 See, e.g., Sedition Act, 1 Stan. 596 (1798) (making it unlawful to "counsel, advise or at-
tempt to procure any insurrection, riot, unlawful assembly, or combination" and subjecting
those who 'write, print, litter or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed,
uttered or published, or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, priming,
uttering or publishing any false, scandalous ini(1 malicious writing or writings against the
government of the United States" to rtes and imprisonment).
3 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927); Gitiow, 268 U.S. at 666-67;
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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In 1969, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court
held that speech tending to promote lawlessness or advocating illegal
activity cannot he restrained by criminal laws unless the speech "is di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action." This standard reflects the Court's be-
lief in the propriety of maintaining a free marketplace of ideas—that
is, censorship is not the preferred means of eliminating the danger of
"bad" ideas in the public consciousness; rather, the preference is to-
ward the free competition of ideas to reveal the truth or falsity of any
particular idea. 5 The Brandenburg test, therefore, preserves the mar-
ketplace by allowing prior restraint of speech only where harmful or
illegal conduct will likely follow so immediately after the speech that
there is no time for debate to stop the harm.6
Furthermore, the Brandenburg standard applies equally to at-
tempts to regulate speech through use of civil, as opposed to criminal,
sanctions.? This is so because imposing tort liability against a speaker
for the harmful results of his speech would constitute state action vio-
lative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 8 As the Supreme
Court noted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, "[w] hat a State may not
constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise
beyond the reach of its civil law of libel."g The rationale for the rule
against criminal sanctions, however, falls short of justifying an abso-
lute bar against civil sanctions. Indeed, the fact that tortious injury has
occurred means that the marketplace has failed to guard against the
4 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1960) (emphasis added).
5 This principle was succinctly captured by Thomas Jefferson when he said in his first
inaugural address, 'Mf there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this union or
utge its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with
which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.'" 117iitney,
274 U.S. at 375 n.3 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Charles A. Beard, THE NivrioN, July
7, 1926, at 8). See also, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (not-
ing "there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries hnt on the competi-
tion of other ideas."); flerceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1987)
(noting the First Amendment protection of the freedom of speech and of the press is "not
based on time naive belief that speech can do no harm but on the confidence that the
benefits society reaps from the free flow and exchange of ideas outweigh the costs society
endures by receiving reprehensible or dangerous ideas.").
6 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Tandy Terrorists But Not
"Natural Born Killers,"27 N. Ky. L Rev. 81, 86 (2000).
7 See, e.g., New York limes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
8 See id. at 277.
9 Id. at 277.
2001] .	 How Words Can Hurl 	 161
harm resulting from bad speech.o Applying the First Amendment
shield to tort actions is especially pernicious when the speaker intends
to cause harm by having speech recipients act in reliance on the
speech or by inspiring the audience to act in criminal or tortious
ways. n
Courts and constitutional scholars alike are in discord over the
appropriateness of the First Amendment's protective veil, particularly
when it functions to protect certain speech, such as materials that in-
struct on how to perform illegal or harmful activity and negligent
publications that contain misinformation, reliance upon which leads
to injury. 12 This Note explores the various types of litigation private
parties have used in attempting to impose liability on speakers whose
speech resulted in harm. Part I offers an abbreviated history of free
speech and censorship and details the modern standard for evaluat-
ing First Amendment cases. 13 Part II summarizes the variety of actions
private parties issue in attempting to impose tort liability on speakers
promulgating instructional speech." Part III summarizes scholarship
criticizing the use of the Brandenburg standard to adjudicate First
Amendment issues. 15 Finally, Part IV analyzes the cases summarized in
Part II through the lens of the critique summarized in Part
I. FREE SPEECH AND CENSORSHIP FROM SCHENCK TO BRANDENBURG
An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, .. .
ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the
press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally
to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-
dealer . . . Acts of whatever kind, which, without justifiable
10 See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40; 1 ferceg, 814 F.2d at 1019,1020-21,
11 See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enter., Inc., 128 F.3d 233,267 (4th Cir. 1997) (sustaining tort
action against publisher for harmful effects of publication).
12 See, e.g., id. at 267; Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Suns, 938 F.2d 1033,1038 (0th Cir. 1091)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant in tort action against publisher for
injury caused by reliance on veracity of contents of publication); see also David Crump,
Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative 'nos, and the Borderland of the Ikan-
denbmg Test, 29 GA. L. Ray. 1,31 (1994).
13 See infra notes 17-78 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 79-182 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 183-201 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 202-258 and accompanying text.
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cause, do harm to others, may be ... controlled ... by the
active interference of mankind. 17
The first grand proclamation regarding the proper limits of gov-
ernment-imposed censorship in light of the First Amendment came in
1919, in Schenck v. United States.' 8 In Schenck, the United States Su-
preme Court unanimously upheld a conviction under the Espionage
Act of 1917 for distributing written materials designed to promote
insubordination and obstruction of recruiting and enlistment for the
United States armed forces. 19 Defendants distributed pamphlets that
claimed conscription was a form of slavery or involuntary servitude
and, thus, violative of the Thirteenth Amendinent. 20 The writings
used impassioned language to intimate that "conscription was despot-
ism in its worst form and a monstrous wrong against humanity in the
interest of Wall Street's chosen few" and vehemently urged opposition
to the draft." The Court found that the intended impact of the writ-
ings was to incite opposition to and obstruction of the draft. 22 Fur-
thermore, the Court noted that the character of any action must be
evaluated based on its context. 25 The Court wrote that, despite the
First Amendment proscription, Congress may restrain speech if it cre-
ates a "clear and present danger" of bringing about some evil that
Congress otherwise has a right to prevent."
The Court essentially reasoned that because Congress was em-
powered to criminalize and enjoin activities that interfered with the
draft—and thus, national defense 25—it was likewise empowered to
criminalize and enjoin speech calculated to achieve that end.26 Thus,
the Court concluded that while during peace-time defendants' activi-
ties might have been considered innocuous, defendants' instant anti-
draft activities constituted a clear and present danger to the posture
17 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 53, (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc. 1984) (1859).
See 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
19 See id. at 47, 48-49, 52-53.
20 See id. at 50-51.
21 Id. at 51.
22 See id. at 51.
" See Schenck , 249 U.S. at 51-52.
24 See id. at 52.
25 See id. at 49. At the time of the Act, the United States was at war with the German
Empire. See id. at 49.
29 See id. at 51-52.
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of the nation's war effort. 27 Accordingly, the Court affirmed their
convictions. 28
Similarly, in 1923, in Gitlow v. New York, the Supreme Court up-
held a conviction under New York's criminal anarchy statute arising
from the distribution of written materials teaching, advising, and ad-
vocating the violent overthrow of the United States government."
The defendant was a member of the "Left Wing Section" of the So-
cialist Party and was responsible for printing and distributing its
"Manifesto."" This Manifesto condemned the democratic strategies of
"moderate Socialism" and urged that revolution must be achieved by
shedding "[t]he old machinery of the state" and by directing the peo-
ple to "conquer and destroy it.""
In evaluating the constitutionality of New York's criminal anarchy
statute, the Court wrote:
The statute does not penalize the utterance or publication of
abstract "doctrine" or academic discussion having no quality
of incitement to any concrete action. It is not aimed against
mere historical or philosophical essays. It does not restrain
the advocacy of changes in the form of government by con-
stitutional and lawful means. What it prohibits is language
advocating, advising or teaching the overthrow of organized
government by unlawful means. These words imply urging to
action. 32
The Court thus concluded that in the interest of self-preservation, the
State may criminalize advocacy that threatens its continuation or es-
sential function.33 The Court gave great deference to the legislature's
determination that advocacy of violent government overthrow posed
such a danger to the general welfare that the state may exercise its
police powers to quash it." At once, the Court recognized that
"[t] here was no evidence of any effect resulting from the publication
and circulation of the Manifesto," and that the effect of such speech
"cannot be accurately foreseen." 35 Indeed, the Court recognized that
27 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51, 52-53.
29 See id.
29 See 268 U.S. 652,654-56,672 (1925).
.50 See id, at 655-56.
31 See id. at 657-59 11.2.
32 Id. at 664-65.
33 See id. at 668.
34 See Udall), 268 U.S. at 668-69.
35 See id. at 656,669.
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the speech and its intended effect may be temporally very distant, if in
fact it ever manifests at all. 36 Nonetheless, the Court affirmed defen-
dant's conviction and the constitutionality of the statute because it
criminalized speech which had the "natural tendency and probable
effect" of bringing out some evil which the State is empowered to pre-
vent."
Justice Holmes wrote a dissenting opinion in Gitlow, in which Jus-
tice Brandeis joined, arguing the propriety of the "clear and present"
danger standard first established in Schenck" He first noted that un-
der such a standard the conviction should be reversed because pub-
lishing and distributing this Manifesto did not create a clear and pres-
ent danger. 39
 Indeed, whatever danger the majority foresaw was,
according to Holmes, too remote to justify its prior restraint." Sec-
ond, Holmes rebuked the majority's characterization of this speech as
more than a theory, but an incitement. 41 He wrote in response that
"[e]very idea is an incitement" and without the probability of a pres-
ent conflagration, each idea should be awarded its opportunity to
emote and inspire within the marketplace. 42
The Court further relaxed the proscription of the First Amend-
ment in 1926, in Whitney v. California, where it upheld a conviction
under California's criminal syndicalism statute for forming and main-
taining membership in the Communist Labor Party of California
(CLP). 43 The defendant was charged with helping to form and being
a member of the CLP, an organization formed for the purpose of ad-
vocating, teaching, aiding and abetting criminal syndicalism.44 The
defendant maintained that it was not her intent that the CLP "be an
instrument of terrorism or violence, and that it was not her purpose
36 See id. at 669 ("A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering [sic]
for a lime, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration.").
37
 See id. at 671,672.
33 See id. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
39 See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
40 See id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
41 See td. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42 See id. ("II' in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are des-
tined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.") (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing).
43 See 274 U.S. 357,372 (1927).
44 See id. at 360. California's criminal syndicalism statute defined criminal syndicalism
as "any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and aliening the commission of
crime, sabotage ... or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terror-
ism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control or effecting
any political change." Id. at 359-60.
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... to violate any 'known law."45 The Court quickly disposed of this
contention by noting that defendant's intention was a matter of fact
settled by the jury's verdict. 46 In any event, the Court noted defen-
dant's apparent "acquiescence" to the CLP's charter advocating vio-
lence as a means for revolution by her continuing membership. 47 The
Court, relying on the pronouncements of Gillow and its predecessors,
declared that the State may, in the exercise of its police powers, re-
strict such speech it thinks might pose a danger to the public welfare
or threaten overthrow by unlawful means, notwithstanding the First
Amendment.48 The Court concluded that California's criminal syndi-
calism statute did not offend the First Amendment and sustained de-
fendant's conviction.49
Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, concurred in affirm-
ing defendant's conviction in Whitney strictly because the issue was not
properly framed for the Court." Despite his concurrence in the
Court's holding, Brandeis was critical of the majority's deferential
standard and argued that it should adhere to the "clear and present
danger" standard for evaluating when speech is appropriately the sub-
ject of prior restraint. 51 He argued that free speech is essential to the
function of a democracy and censorship, running counter to that
function, could only be justified in instances of emergency, when
"immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated";
otherwise, the appropriate method of combating evil speech is by
"more speech, not enforced silence." 52 He further argued that even in
instances of emergency, censorship is still not justified unless the
harm to society is relatively serious." He wrote that the appropriate
response to speech tending to lead to social unrest is education and
punishment for actual violations of the law. 54 He argued that Califor-
nia's criminal syndicalism statute was constitutional on its face be-
cause it criminalized actions that concern "immediate preservation of
the public peace and safety This did not mean, however, that
45 Id. at 366.
45 See id, at 367.
47 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 367-68.
45 See id, at 371.
45 See id. at 372.
55 See id. at 372-80 (Brandeis j., concurring).
51 See id (Brandeis J., concurring).
52 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-77 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
53 See id. at 377-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
54 See id. at 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
55 Id. (quoting California Criminal Syndicalism Act § 4) (Brat uleis, J., concurring).
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the statute was not vulnerable to a constitutional challenge as applied
in these circumstances for want of a clear and present danger of seri-
ous evi1.56 Although Brandeis believed it was doubtful that the evi-
dence of the activities in this case presented a "clear and present dan-
ger," he concluded that the judgment must be affirmed because this
question was not properly before the Court. 57
Similarly, in 1950, in Dennis v. United States, the United States Su-
preme Court affirmed defendants' convictions for violating the Smith
Act58 by advocating and teaching the necessity and propriety of a vio-
lent government overthrow and by organizing the Communist Party
of the United States for this purpose.59 Significantly, the plurality deci-
sion rekindled the use of the clear and present danger standard from
the murk of the majority opinion in Whitney.° In so doing, it adopted
Chief Judge Learned ,Hand's interpretation that "[i]n each case
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by the
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to
avoid the danger."61 The plurality also clarified that the existence of a
clear and present danger is a determination of law, not fact, and thus,
within the province of judges. 62 The plurality reasoned that the de-
fendants' actions in poSluring the Communist Party to indoctrinate
members for the ultimate purpose of overthrowing the government
by use of force and violence "as speedily as circumstances permit"
posed a clear and present danger that such revolution would take
place.°5 Thus, it upheld defendants' convictions under the Smith Act,
the First Amendment notwithstanding. 64
After Dennis, the Supreme Court began to draw limits on punish-
ing advocacy that was too attenuated from its intended criminal effect.
In 1957, in Yates v. United States, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed convictions for advocating and conspiring to advocate the vio-
lent overthrow of government in violation of the Smith Act, and or-
56 See id. at 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
57 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 378-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
55 18 U.S.C. § 2385(a) (1946) (making it unlawful to knowingly advocate, aid and abet
or teach the necessity of governmental overthrow by use of force or violence or to organize
or help to organize an association of persons designed to teach, advocate or encourage
same).
" See 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951).
60 See id. at 510.
61 ht. (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2(1 201, 212 (2d. Cir. 1950)).
G2 See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 513-15.
G3 See id. at 508-10.
See id. at 517.
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dered a new trial.° In Yates, the jury convicted defendants clue, in
part, to an instruction by the trial judge that permitted the jury to
convict if they found that defendants taught or advocated the forcible
overthrow of the government, even as an abstract principle.° The
Court rejected the trial judge's assessment of the law and stated that
the teaching of Dennis was that the First Amendment permits indi-
viduals to advocate the moral necessity of forcible overthrow provided
that such advocacy is focused on some future time and does not in-
volve any quality of incitement. 67 The Court wrote:
The essence of the Dennis holding was that indoctrination of
a group in preparation for future violent action ... is not
constitutionally protected when the group is of sufficient size
and cohesiveness, is sufficiently oriented towards action, and
other circumstances are such as reasonably to justify appre-
hension that action will occur.°
Thus, the Court noted that advocacy of criminal conduct that is both
too attenuated and improbable cannot be constrained in light of the
First Amendment. 69 Accordingly, the Court reversed defendants' con-
victions and remanded the case for a new trial with proper instruc-
tions."
Filially, in 1969, the First Amendment shield afforded to speakers
was radically enlarged when, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the United States
Supreme Court held that Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute was un-
constitutional on the basis that it sought to punish individuals who
taught or advocated the moral necessity of violence or criminal con-
duct as a means of social or political reform as well as those who vol-
untarily assembled for that purpose. 71 In Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan
(KKK) leader had been fined and sentenced to a prison term of no
more than ten years for attending and speaking at a televised KKK
65 See 354 U.S. 298, 338 (1957), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United Slates, 437
U.S. 1, 1 (1978).
66 See Vales, 354 U.S. at 317-18.
67 See id. at 310-20.
66 Id, at 321.
66 See id.
76 See id. at 338.
71 See 395 U.S. al 449. The statute punished  a person for — advocat(ing)	 the ditty,
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform' and for 'voluntarily assembl(ing)
with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doc-
trines of criminal syndicalism.'" Id. at 444-45 (1969) (quoting 01110 REV. CODE ANN.
2923.13).
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rally about the potential need for "revengeance" against the President
and Congress should they continue their perceived scheme of white
oppression." Approximately a dozen hooded KKK members attended
the rally, at which they burned a cross and carried weapons; the
speaker, however, did not carry a weapon."
The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion used the Holmes-
Brandeis language but nonetheless represented an interpretive break
with the former Justices' clear and present danger standard. The
Court in Brandentnag effectively overturned a half century of perva-
sive precedent permitting the prior restraint of speech and ideas
deemed destructive of democracy and capitalism, and declared
criminal syndicalism statutes of more than twenty States unconstitu-
tional." The Court concluded that the thrust of the post-Whitney deci-
sions militate against proscribing mere advocacy." Thus, the Court
modified the clear and present danger standard outlined in Dennis
and Yates by restricting the temporal element." In overturning the
defendant's conviction in this case, the Court reasoned that the' only
type of speech that can be subject to prior restraint is that which is
"directed to incit[e] or produc[e] imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action."" This case remains the stan-
dard against which virtually all incarnations of private and public cen-
sorship are challenged, including tort challenges to instructional
speech."
II. BRANDENBURG AS APPLIED GENERALLY PROHIBITS RECOVERY
AGAINST SPEAKERS IN TORT
In the more than thirty years since the Supreme Court's decision
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, a number of courts have dealt with common-
77 See id. at 445, 447.
75 See id. at 445-46.
7 ' 1 See id. at 447, 449 (explicitly overruling Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)).
75 Id. at 447.
76 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49. While the Cou•t in Dennis and Yates was not
overtly specific about when the probable consequence of the speech needed to manifest,
the Court in Brandenburg interpreted these cases as requiring that schemes of prior re-
straint may only apply to speech likely to cause imminent criminal activity. See id. at 448-49,
44811.2.
77 See id. at 447.
78 See, e.g., Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559, at *63-72 (S.D.
Tex. 1997); Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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law tort challenges to instructional speech. 79 The Supreme Court it-
self, on the other hand, has remained silent on the issue. Generally
speaking, these cases fall into four categories: those involving claims
of (1) erroneous instructions; (2) dangerous histructions; (3) active
encouragement and facilitation of illegal or dangerous conduct; and
(4) passive encouragement or inspiration to engage in illegal or dan-
gerous activity.80
A. Erroneous Instruction—Gases
As noted, one category of instructional speech that historically
has been challenged under common-law tort principles is that involv-
ing erroneous instructions. 81 These suits typically involve claims of
negligence, misrepresentation or strict products liability, and are
brought against the publishers of "how to" books containing errors
that, when relied upon by the reader, led to harm.82 For example, in
1977, in Cardozo v. True, the District Court of Appeal of Florida held
that a plaintiff who suffered severe food poisoning as a result of an
error in a cookbook's instructions could not sustain an action against
the retailer of the cookbook." In True, a woman followed a recipe in a
cookbook she purchased from the defendant book retailer. 84 In the
process of preparing the dish, she tasted one of the ingredients and
suffered severe food poisoning. 85 The plaintiff claimed that the de-
fendant (1) failed to adequately instruct the user not to taste the par-
ticular ingredient prior to cooking it; (2) warn that the ingredient was
poisonous; and (3) adequately test to ensure safety for human con-
sumption." Similarly, the plaintiff argued that defendant breached an
79 See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 1997) (sustaining
action against publisher for publishing dangerous instructional pamphlet under theory of
wrongful death); lierceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1987) (dismiss-
ing action against magazine for publishing dangerous instructional article under theories
of negligence, prodticts liability, dangerous instrumentality, and attractive nuisance).
8° See Andrew 8. Sims, Tort Liability for Physical Injuries Allegedly Resulting from Media
Speech: A Comprhensive First Amendment App .oach, 34 Aim. L. REV. 231, 235 (1992).
81 See id. at 235-38.
82 Sre frt.
xs See 342 So.2d 1053, 1054-55, 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The court here, how-
ever, does not reach the issue of whether a publisher or author may be held liable under
the same action, nor whether a retailer with actual knowledge or the dangers contained in
the cookbook could be held liable under such an action. See id. at 1057.
84 See id. at 1054.
85 See id.
88 See id.
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implied warranty of accuracy and fitness for human consumption. 87
The Court rejected plaintiffs contentions, reasoning that the chilling
effect on free speech and expression would be too great if a retailer
was liable for the mistakes in its publications. 88 Additionally, the court
held that implied warranties pertain only to the physical properties of
the product and not to the thought processes conveyed by the
author.89 Thus, the court ruled that the First Amendment acted as a
complete bar to plaintiffs' recovery because ideas emanating from
written words were not part of the "product" for purposes of strict
products liability and requiring retailers to warn of possible inaccura-
cies in a publication would have too great a chilling effect on speech
and expression so
Similarly, in 1991, in Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the publisher
of The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms could not be held liable for plaintiffs'
illness resulting from ingesting poisonous mushrooms that the book
mistakenly identified to be safe for human consumption 91 Plaintiffs,
in reliance on the veracity of the information contained in the book,
prepared and ate poisonous wild mushrooms and became severely
ill—so ill, in fact, that each required a liver transplant.92 Plaintiffs
sought to impose liability against the publisher under theories of
products liability, breach of warranty, negligent misrepresentation and
false representations.° Again, like in True, the court reasoned that the
defendant publisher could not be held liable under these theories
without first finding that either the publisher must guarantee the ve-
racity of information contained in its publications or that it had a duty
to investigate their accuracy; the court was unwilling to find either. 94
B. Dangerous Instruction—Cases
The second category of instructional speech that has been chal-
lenged under common-law tort principles is that involving danger-
ous—as opposed to merely erroneous—instructions. The cases typi-
87
 See id.
88 See True, 342 So. 2c1 at 1055 (arguing that such a rule would impose a hefty burden
on retailers to investigate the veracity and safety of the contents of each of their products).
89 See id. at 1056.
9° See id. at 1054-57.
c' 1 See938 F.2d 1033,1037-38 (9th Cir. 1991).
92 See id. at 1034.
u 3
 See id.
" See id. at 1035-38.
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cally arise when a plaintiff charges a speaker with giving instructions
to perform an inherently dangerous activity without. adequately warn-
ing of the dangers. 95 For example, in 1987, in the case of Herceg v.
Hustler Magazine, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the First Amendment protected Hustler magazine from
tort liability arising from the death of a boy who was allegedly inspired
to attempt auto-erotic asphyxiation by an article entitled "Orgasm of
Death."96 A fourteen-year-old boy accidentally hanged himself at-
tempting the act of auto-erotic asphyxiation as described in the arti-
cle." His. friend discovered him hanging nude in his closet with the
magazine open to the article lying at his feet."
The boy's mother and brother originally sued Hustler under
theories of negligence, products liability, dangerous instru ►entalky
and attractive nuisance. 99 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas dismissed this initial action, reasoning that
the First Amendment barred ordinary tort action against the maga-
zine even though the article attractively portrayed and instructed
readers as to how to execute an inherently dangerous—indeed,
deadly—actiVity. 1 " The plaintiffs, however, were given leave to amend
their complaint and refile under an incitement theory in concert with
the Brandenburg standard. 1 °1 At trial, the jury found that the article,
"Orgasm of Death," directly incited the decedent to perform the act
of auto-erotic asphyxiation, which ultimately led to his death.'°2
The Fifth Circuit reversed the jury's determination.'" As an ini-
tial matter, the court questioned whether written material could ever
constitute direct incitement under a Brandenburg analysisl" but noted
that "[w]hether written material might ever be found to create culpa-
ble incitement unprotected by the first amendment is . a question
95 See Sims, supra note 80, at 238-39 (discussing Walt Disney Prod. v. Shannon, 276
S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981)).
90 See 814 F.2d at 1025.
97 See id. at 1019.
98 See id.
" See id.
I" See id.
tot See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1019.
1 °2 See id.
los See id. at 1023-25.
101 The phrase "Brandenburg analysis" refers to the Court's test in Brandeothurg for de-
ternthiing whether certain speeds is appropriately the sullied of prior restraint, that is,
whether the speech "is directed to inciting or producing imminent. lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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that we do not now reach."105
 The court went on to conclude that,
even assuming Brandenburg did cover such written materials, given the
self-explanatory nature of the act and the absence of any overt exhor-
tation in the article, it could not, as a matter of law, constitute incite-
ment. 1 °6
In a concurring and dissenting opinion to Herceg, one judge as-
serted that the Hustler article was pornography, and thus, not deserv-
ing of First Amendment protection. 1°7 Furthermore, the judge sought
to balance the values involved and concluded that, although First
Amendment protections are broad, they were never intended to be
preeminent to peoples' lives.w° Although the judge conceded that
First Amendment jurisprudence is an exercise in line drawing, she
maintained that the burden is on the judges to evaluate seriously
where specific speech falls in the hierarchy of First Amendment juris-
prudence.w°
C. Active Encouragement and Facilitation—Cases
As alluded to by the court in Herceg, the presence or absence of
any direct exhortation to commit a dangerous or illegal activity can be
significant in assessing whether speech is protected by the First
Amendment. 11° Indeed, unlike the situation in Herceg, active encour-
agement cases, which typically involve speakers encouraging an audi-
ence to commit certain illegal or inherently dangerous acts, are rather
consistently found to meet the strict requirements of Brandenburgm
Thus, tort liability is often permitted to lie against such speakers." 2
For example, in 1975, in Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., the Su-
preme Court of California held that a radio station could be held li-
able for its broadcast, which inspired two listeners to drive recklessly
toward an announced location, killing another driver in the proc-
ess. 1 l 3 The plaintiff in Weirton brought a wrongful death action against
a radio station for its promotion that urged people to drive to the lo-
toy I lerceg, 814 F.2t1 at 10'23.
1 °6 See id. at 1023-25.
107 See id. at 1025-26 ( Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
108 See id. at 1026 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
mg See id, at 1027 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
110 See I lerceg, 814 F.2d at 1023-25.
11 See, e.g., Weir= v. RKO Ceti., inc., 539 13.2d 36, 46 (Cal. 1975).
12 See id. at 51.
114 see id. at 43-45.
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cation of a disc jockey to receive a prize. 114 Two listeners, incited to
reach the disc jockey, drove recklessly toward his location and in the
process drove another vehicle off the road, killing the driver. 115 The
Supreme Court of California affirmed the jury's determination that
the defendant radio station was liable under a negligence theory for
the "foreseeable results of a broadcast which created an undue risk of
harm . . .." 116
Weirum hardly made mention of the First Amendment except to
note that it does not erect a barrier to liability. 117 Later cases, however,
have interpreted Weirum to be a case of "true" incitement, in harmony
with Brandenburg. 118 This interpretation highlights the fact that the
disc jockey's directives were in close temporal proximity to the reck-
less driving that caused decedent's death. 119 In addition, because the
disc jockey issued repeated live exhortations to listeners urging them
to act in an inherently dangerous manner, the foreseeability of such
action on the part of listeners was high. 12°
The distribution of information, previously unknown to a speech
recipient, and integral to executing harmful or illegal conduct, is of-
ten a component of active encouragement cases; there are, however,
examples of pure facilitation cases. 121 For example, in 1982, in Hyde v.
City of Columbia, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a crime vic-
tim who suffered subsequent harassment by her attacker could sue
two newspapers for publishing her identity and address. 122 In this
case, the victim's attacker was able to identify and locate her from the
publication of her name and address. 123 The court found that the
name and address of the plaintiff/victim was not a matter of public
record as it was information pertaining to an ongoing investigation
111 See
115 See id.
1111 Weirum, 539 P.2d at 48.
I " See id. ("Defendant's contention that the giveaway contest must be affbrded the
deference due society's interest. in the First Amendment is clearly without merit The
First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical ininry merely because
achieved by word, rather thaw act.").
na See e.g., Shannon, 276 S.E.2d at 582 n.2; Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 126 Cal.
App. 3d 488, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); see also Terri R. Day, Publications That Incite, Solicit, or
Instruct: Publisher Responsibility or Caveat Emplar?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 77 n.27, 77-78
(1995).
119 See Day, supra note 118, at 77-78.
120 see id.
121 See, e.g., Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 273 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); see also
Sims, supra note 80, at 249-54.
122 See 637 S.W.2d at 253, 273.
See id. at 253.
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and, indeed, the policy of the jurisdiction is to suppress such informa-
tion from public disclosure, 124 Additionally, the court reasoned that
publishing the identity and location of a crime victim where the
criminal is still at large was not of sufficient public concern to warrant
First Amendment protection. 125 Thus, the court held that a negli-
gence action could be brought against the two local newspapers. 126
Other facilitation cases have involved suits against publications
for matching up criminal conspirators.'" For example, in 1989, in
Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Soldier of Fortune magazine can-
not be held liable under a negligence theory for publishing an am-
biguous advertisement that led to a hired killing. 128 In Eimann, a man
learned of the services of a mercenary via an ambiguous advertise-
limn in Soldier of Fortune magazine and then hired this individual to
kill his wife. 129 The victim's survivors filed a wrongful death action
against the publication for negligently publishing the advertise-
ment. 1" In rejecting plaintiffs' claim, the court investigated the intent
of the publisher and the reasonable implication of the advertisement
as understood by the ordinary reader in context."' The court also
weighed the probability of harm resulting from the ad against the
burden of preventing it—a burden that would presumably impose a
duty to investigate each advertisement. 132 Iii other words, the court
performed a standard risk-utility negligence analysis on publishing
this ad to determine whether a duty existed to quash this type of am-
biguous advertisement."3
Conspicuously, although the Fifth Circuit in Eimann held that
there was no duty to investigate facially innocuous ads, it did not dis-
124
 See id. at 2G9. But see Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-97 (1975) (hold-
ing that a right to he free from publicity does not preclude a newspaper from publishing
truthful information that is otherwise available to the public). For bi•die'. discussion of
Cox, see John J. Watkins, The Privacy Toil: An Arkansas Guide, 1993 ARK. L. No'rEs 91, 97
(1993).
125 See Hyde, 637 S.W.2d at 253, 269, 273.
126
 See id. at 273.
127 See, e.g., Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc. , 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992);
Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989).
128
 See id. at 838.
122 Id. at 831-32. The all read: "EX-MARINES-67-69 . 'Nam Vets, Ex-[ Drill Instructor],
weapons specialist—jungle warfare, pilot, [multi-engine planes], high risk assignments,
U.S. or overseas." Id. at 831.
158 See id. at 832.
LSI See id. at 836-37.
132 See id. at 837-38.
133 See Eimann, 880 F.2d at 837-38.
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cuss whether the First Amendment absolves a publisher of liability for
the negligent publication of advertisements reasonably understood to
be unambiguous solicitations for illegal conduct. 134 This left open the
question whether the First Amendment would bar suit if a reasonable
reader had understood the ad as soliciting illegal mercenary work." 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit took
up this question in 1992, in Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,
where the court held that a different advertisement in Soldier of
Fortune magazine was an unambiguous solicitation for illegal work.' 56
On this basis, the court further held that Soldier of Fortune magazine
could be liable in a wrongful death action for facilitating the
connection between criminal conspirators.'" The court in Braun
attempted to strike a balance between the First Amendment rights of
publishers and the state's interest in protecting the public by
imposing liability on publishers only where their advertisements
contain "a clearly identifiable unreasonable risk, that the offer in the
ad is one to commit a serious violent crime,"" 8 According to the
court, any consequent duty to investigate would be de minimis."9
As stated above, rather than being instances of either pure en-
couragement or pure facilitation, most cases in this category are more
accurately described as a mixture of both. 14° Indeed, in 1997, in Rice v.
Paladin Enterprises, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the First Amendment was not a bar to plain-
tiffs' wrongful death suit against the publisher of a pamphlet that
both inspired and enabled a man to proceed on a path of killing for
hire."' In Rice, the survivors of three murder victims sued the pub-
lisher of a pamphlet that provided detailed instructions on how to
solicit, plan, execute and cover-up murders for hire. 142 For purposes
of summary judgment, the defendant-publisher stipulated that it
knew and intended the pamphlet to he used by people to become or
I" See id. at 833-38.
It See id.
I" See 968 F.2d at 1122. The advertisement read as follows: "GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year
old professional mercenary desires jobs. Vietnam Vetentn. Discrete Isie I and very private.
Body guard, courier, and other special skills. All jobs considered." Id. at 1112.
1" See id. at 1112,1122.
;" Id. at 1118.
1 S9 See id. at 1119; see also Day, supra note 118, a1.91.
140 See, e.g., Rice, 128 17.3d 233.
141 See id. at 267.	 •
145 See id. at 291. Redacted portions of the original text of "1-lit Man" are laid out in the
opinion for edification. See id. at 235-39.
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hire contract killers. 143
 The defendant then asked the court to declare
that nonetheless, as a matter of law, the First Amendment acted as a
complete bar to plaintiffs' wrongful death action. 144
Whereas the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Fourth
Circuit rejected the notion that the First Amendment shielded defen-
dant from liability in a wrongful death action where their publication
aided and abetted the actual killer. 145 The court stated that the type of
publication at issue in the case, although not sufficient to satisfy the
stringent requirements of Brandenburg, was nonetheless offensive to
the preservation of an ordered society. 146
 Therefore, according to the
court, because the publication was integral in effectuating activity that
could lawftilly be suppressed, the publisher could be equally liable for
its part in the conspiracy. 147
D. Passive Encouragement—Cases
In contrast to active encouragement and facilitation cases, cases
brought against speakers under a theory of passive encouragement or
inspiration of tortious conduct—that is, cases where speech recipients
imitate the harmful or illegal acts described or depicted by the
speaker—are rarely sustained. 148
 For example, in 1982, in Olivia N. v.
National Broadcasting Co., the First District of the California Court of
Appeals held that a television station could not be held liable for an
artificial rape, allegedly inspired by a scene in a movie it had broad-
cast, because the movie did not constitute incitement under the Bran-
denburg standard. 149 In Olivia, the plaintiff sued a television network
for negligently airing the television movie "Born Innocent.” 15° The
plaintiff, a minor child who was gang raped by four minor girls using
a bottle, alleged that a scene in the film depicting a similar violent
artificial rape inspired her attackers to imitate this conduct. 151 The
crux of the plaintiffs claim was that the network was negligent for
1"3 See id. at 241.
1 '' 4 See id. at 241-42.
"5 See Rice, 128 F.3(1 at 242-43.
116 See id. at 243.
"7
 See id. at 266-67.
"8 See, e.g., Davidson v. Time Warner, inc., 1997 U.S. Dist.. LEXIS 21559, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. 1997); Olivia, 126 Cal, App. 3d at 488.
1 ' 19 See id. at 494-95, 497. As used by the court, this term connotes the act of vaginal
penetration by use of all instrument. See id. at 492.
15° See id. at 491.
151 See id. at 491-92.
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broadcasting the violent film at a time when children and adolescents
could watch it because children' and adolescents are peculiarly im-
pressionable and likely to imitate violent acts depicted on television. 152
Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that in order to secure the .widest
possible audience,' the network negligently broadcasted the film with-
out any warnings regarding its violent coiitent. 153 Perhaps in error, the
plaintiff conceded that the broadcast, although violent, did not advo-
cate or encourage violent behaviOr and, therefore, did not constitute
incitement under Brandenburg. 154 On this basis, the court rejected
plaintiff's claims noting that, "television networks would become sig-
nificantly more inhibited in the selection of controversial materials if
liability were to be imposed on a simple negligence theory." 155 The
court further distinguished Weirum on the basis that the action result-
ing from the radio broadcasts in Weirum were actively elicited whereas
the broadcast in the instant case was not. 156 The court concluded that
since the "viewers of 'Born Innocent' acted on the stimulus of the
broadcast rather than in response to encouragement of such con-
duct," Weirum was not controlling in the instant suit. 157 Having deter-
mined that imposing civil liability on the broadcaster would essentially
be a content-based restriction on speech and would have a chilling
effect similar to a system of prior restraint, the court affirmed the
dismissal of the action. 158
Similarly, in 1997, in Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that a
music label could not be held liable for the shooting of a police offi-
cer allegedly inspired by the music on a rap album because the mes-
sages on the album did not constitute incitement under a Brandenburg
analysis.' 59 In Davidson, a police officer was shot to death by a man he
had stopped for a traffic violation.m The officer's survivors filed suit
against the producers and distributors of the rap albuin "2Pacalypse
Now" alleging that the album inspired the shooter to kill the dece-
dent.'" In their attempt to lift the First Amendment shield, the plain-
152 See id. at 492.
153 See Olivia, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 492.
1 " See id. at 494-95.
155 Id. at 494.
156 See id. at 496.
157 Id.
' 58 See Olivia, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 497.
159 See 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559, at *71-72.
169 See id. at *4.
191 See id. at *4-6.
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tiffs set forth a number of claims, all of which, if proven, would consti-
tute exceptions to the protection of the First Amendment. 162 The
plaintiffs claimed that the album contained fighting words, was ob-
scene, defamed nonspecific peace officers like the decedent, and
tended to incite imminent illegal conduct, including the shooting of a
police officer. 163
The court first evaluated the merits of the case under Eimann by
weighing the risks of the speech against the burdens imposed by self-
censorship—the natural result of tort liability. 164 Although recogniz-
ing the Fifth Circuit's implicit instruction in Eimann that advertise-
ments that are overt in their message to solicit or elicit criminal con-
duct are not protected speech, the court nevertheless distinguished
the instant case. 168 The court stated that the probability that a listener
would act on the album's message—i.e., shoot people, including po-
lice officers—is substantially less than the probability that mercenaries
and patrons would connect via advertisements to perform illegal
acts. 166 The court further asserted that the costs of self-censorship are
very high to the defendant as well as to the public because the inevi-
table result is production of only the blandest, least controversial mu-
sic. 167
 Furthermore, the court found that because shooting the officer
was an irrational and illegal act, it was not inevitable or even probable,
and thus, the defendants were not legally obligated to foresee it. 168
Finally, the court painstakingly rebuked plaintiffs' contentions that
152 See id. at *6.
163 See id. at *6. As to the claim that the album tends to incite imminent illegal con-
duct, the court took notice of the following lyrics from the album:
Now I could be a crooked nigga too When I'm rain with my crew
Watch what crooked niggas do
I got a nine millimeter Clack pistol
I'm ready to get with you at the trip of the whistle
So make your move and act like you wanna flip
fired 13 shots and popped another clip
My brain locks, my Clock's like a f—kin mop,
The more I shot, the more mothaf—ka's dropped
And even cops got shot when they rolled up.
Id. at *4 n.4.
164 See Davidson, 1097 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559, at *36-38.
165 See id.
155 See id. In bolstering this argtunent, the court cites the fact that at least seven illegal
connections were made through Soldier of Fortune advertisements whereas this is the only
incident of incitement claimed vis-a-vis this album after more than 400,000 were sold. See
id. at *37.
167 See id.
16g See id. at *41142.
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the album falls under any of the pre-existing carved-out categories of
communications that are deemed unworthy of First Amendment pro-
tection—i.e., obscenity, defamation and fighting words. 169 The court
ultimately granted defendants' motion for summary judgment find-
ing that a tort action cannot lie against the producers)"
The issues in Davidson are relevant to a pending lawsuit in Massa-
chusetts filed by the surviving parents of Jeffrey Curley. In 1997, Jef-
frey Curley, a ten-year-old boy, was abducted, molested, mutilated, and
murdered by two men, one of whom was a member of the North
American Man-Boy Love Association (NAMBLA). 1 " Plaintiffs allege
that hundreds of pages of NAMBLA publications were found in the
possession of the inurderei .s172 and that they accessed NAMBLA's web-
site at the Boston Public Library just before endeavoring to abduct,
molest, mutilate, and murder Jeffrey Curley)" In their wrongful
death action against NAMBLA, plaintiffs claim that certain of its web-
based and print publications "promoted, advocated, conspired, and
urged the general public to rape young male children and provided
information to assist the general public in obtaining child pornogra-
phy and pedophile related materials." 174
161) See Davidson, 1907 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559, at *51-72. For example, the court noted
that to qualify speech as obscene, it must contain "'patently offensive representations or
descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals
....'" Id. at *53 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973)). At once, the court
denounced the album's use of "expletives and depictions of violence," and noted that
"overall the album is extremely repulsive" while holding that because the "2Pacalypse
Now" lyrics were not of a .sexualt5, explicit nature, but rather, mainly appeal to the prurient
interest in violence, they could not, as a matter of law, qualify as obscenity. See id. at *51, 53.
Furthermore, the court found that the "2Pacalypse Now" lyrics cannot qualify as defama-
tory language, inter alma, because the target of defamation was non-specific. See Id. at *51)-
57, Finally, the court noted that in order filr utterances to (plant} , as "fighting words," they
must be "personally abusive epithets" hurled at the actor, and the reaction to the utterance
must be both reflexive and directed back at the speaker. See id, at *59-60. Because the ac-
tor was neither acting reflexively nor were the utterances directed toward any single per-
son, they could not qualify as fighting words. See id. at *50-60, *63.
170 See id, at *71-72.
171 See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief
Can Be Granted at 4, Curley, et. al. v. North American Man Boy Love Association, et. al.,
(No. 00CV10956 GAO) !hereinafter "Cawley Motion to Dismiss".1; Cheryl Wetzstcin, Court
Gets Pedophile Group E-nrail; Slain Boy's Parents Suingfir Damagrs, WAsit. Timm, Oct. 24, 2000,
at AS.
172 See Ralph Ranalli, ACLU Asks judge to Throw Out Cathy Suit Against NAMBLA, Bos-
TON Gtonr., Dec:. 12, 2000, at 1133.
175 See Siobhan Morrissey, Unsavory Speech: A Pedophile Murder Case Drags the First
Amendment Back Into Court, 87 A.B.A. J. 20 ( Jan. 2001).
174 Curley Motion to Dismiss, supra note 171, at 4.
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Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 175
 This
motion is still pending before the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts. 176 Defendants contest that NAMBLA materi-
als constitute advocacy of this kind, instead averring that these mate-
rials condemn sex abuse and coercive sexual relations.'" Further-
more, defendants maintain that although NAMBLA opposes age-of-
consent laws and provides pornographic material, NAMBLA does not
urge, advocate, or condone raping young male children. 178 Defen-
dants alternatively maintain that even if such advocacy can be gleaned
from these web and print materials, plaintiffs' action is nonetheless
barred by the First Amendment under Brandenburg. 179 First, they claim
that because plaintiffs do not allege that the alleged advocacy was di-
rected to any particular person, but rather to the public at large, the
speech cannot be "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action."'" Defendants argue that aiming speech to a particular indi-
vidual is necessary in order to constitute advocacy."' Second, defen-
dants argue that any conduct arguably advocated by defendants' pub-
lications was not imminent—in other words, Jeffrey Curley's death was
not the likely result of defendants' publications. 182
III. SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF BRANDENIJURG STANDARD
Because of the restrictiveness of the Brandenburg v. Ohio standard,
courts have been forced to hold that the First Amendment insulates
speakers from tort liability for harm arguably flowing from their
175 See id. at 2. Plaintiffs subsequently moved the court to permit them to amend their
complaint to include charges against NAMBLA under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO). This motion is also still pending in the District Court. See
J. M. Lawrence, ACLU Terms NAMBLA Suit a "Witch Hunt,"HosToN HERA LD, billy 18,2001,
at 28; J. M. Lawrence, Curleys Add 20 Members of NAMBLA to Federal Suit, BOSTON HERALD,
Sept. 27,2001, at 26 [hereinafter Lawrence, Curleys Add 201.
176 Curley Motion to Dismiss, supra note 171, at 2; Lawrence, Curleys Add 20, supra note
175, at 26.
177 Curley Motion to Dismiss, supra note 171, at 7-8.
179 See id. at 7-8 n.l. Defendants further challenge plaintiffs' contention that any spe-
cific materials advocate or urge the general public to rape young boys. See id. at 6. They
note that plaintiffs' point only to the "totality of the child sex environment" defendants
allegedly perpetuate, and inn any specific materials or statements in order to justify this
contention. See id. at 6.
179
 See Curley Motion to Dismiss, supra note 171, at 9-16.
180
 See id. at 11 (quoting Brandenburg; 395 U.S. at 447).
181 See id. at 12.
182 See id.
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speech. 185 Dissatisfied with this outcome, some scholars have argued
that the imminence requirement of Brandenburg gives greater First
Amendment protection to these potential tortfeasors than is appro.
priate. 184 As one such scholar has argued, "the state has an important
interest in safeguarding persons from physical harm. To deny recov-
ery in these cases lessens [speakers') incentive [s] to remove from the
marketplace material that is dangerous and leads unwitting users to
injure themselves, their property, or others." 185 Thus, although some
courts are afraid of the chilling effect that such sanctions would have
on speech, many scholars are calling for state action in the form of
tort liability to effect the responsible exercise of First Amendment
freedoms. 186
In urging for tort liability, scholars recognize that the First
Amendment does not immunize publishers for negligence in other
areas of law. 187 There are a variety of categories of speech that cur-
rently do not warrant First Amendment protection. Among these are:
(1) defamatory and libelous speech;188 (2) obscene speech; 189 (3)
fighting words;"° (4) speech that directly incites illegal conduct: 191
and (5) other such "utterances that have no appreciable value as
speech and that have a direct propensity to cause serious harm." 02
This is not to say that such speech does not implicate the First
Amendment; rather, courts have explicitly or implicitly valued certain
forms of speech over others. 193 In deriving categories of diminished
183 See, supra notes 79-182 and accompanying text.
181 See, e.g., Sims, supra note 80, at 262 ("The Brandenburg test. is ... overly-protective
as applied to some, and conceptually inappropriate as applied to the majority, of the me-
dia physical injury cases."); Malloy, supra note 6, at 105-10; Day, supra note 118, al 73-76.
I85
	
supra note 118, at 76.
186 See, e.g., id. at 75-76.
1137 See id. at 90-91 (referring to negligence standard fO• publisher liability finr libel as
established in Gertz a: Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)). Professor Day clarified that
the types of speech addressed by his article do not. fall into the category of "of public con-
cern," which is the core meaning of the First Amendment and ought to be the central
tenet of its protection. See id. at 75-76.
188 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52.
IRS See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,23-24 (1973).
190 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,573-74 (1942).
1St See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
152 See Crump, supra note 12, at 30; see also Weirtun v. RK0 Gen., inc., 539 P.2(1 36,48
(Cal. 1975).
19s
	 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (noting that there are such categories of speech
that "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality"). This is most (widen' when comparing the Court's
treatment of and standards for evaluating libel of private persons versus public figures.
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protection, courts have, in essence, weighed the societal value of each
type of speech against the actual or potential harm derived from it. 194
The above-mentioned categories do not survive the weighing process,
i.e., their value to society is too low in light of the potential for
harm. 195
Various other scholars have suggested that a balancing test
should be employed for other categories of speech. Such a balancing
test might equate violence with obscenity and evaluate it as a prurient
interest. 196 One such scholar, Professor David Crump, has derived a
balancing test that enumerates a number of factors for judges or ju-
ries to consider in the First Amendment calculus. 197 Among these are:
the express words or symbols uttered; ... the context, in-
cluding the medium, the audience, and the surrounding
communications; ... the predictability and anticipated seri-
ousness of unlawful results, and whether they actually occurred;
.. . the extent of the speaker's knowledge or reckless disre-
gard of the likelihood of violent results; ... the inclusion of
disclaimers; and ... the existence or nonexistence of serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 198
According to Crump, such a contextual evaluation of various
forms of expression, which are alleged to cause harm or injury, is es-
sential in weeding out protected from unprotected speech.'" When a
speaker intends to emote an audience and when that audience is
likely to be emoted by the speech as well as by the particular medium
used—such as music, television, or pornography—Crump maintains
that liability for actual harm resulting from the speech should be
placed on the speaker in addition to the actual perpetrator. 2" Simply
put, Crump argues that a common sense determination should be
Compare Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52 (finding that reporting on private figures unimportant in
scheme of First Amendment values justifying limitation by sustaining libel and defamation
actions) with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-84, 292 (1964) (]folding
that reporting on public figures too important to values embodied in First Amendment,
namely self-government, to justify chilling effect of libel or defamation action).
19.1 See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40; Miller, 413 U.S. at 21-23; Chaptinsky, 315 U.S. at
571-72.
195 See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40; Miller, 413 U.S. at 21-23; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
571-72.
19° SeeCrtimp, supra note 12, at 31.
197
 See id. at 51.
198 Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
199 See id. at 713-79.
2E1' 1 See id.
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used that accounts for the totality of the circumstances presented in
each case, not the least of which should be the potential impact on
permissible and desirable First Amendment discourse.m
1V. ANALYSIS
The stringent standard established by the Brandenburg v. Ohio
Court represents a backlash, in theory if not in form, against decades
of precedent2o and dozens of state and federal laws, which in practice
criminalized relatively non-threatening criminal advocacy. 20 The
Brandenburg standard clearly descends from the "clear and present"
danger standard first iterated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United
States2" and later expounded upon by Justices Holmes and Brandeis
in Gitlow v. New York and Whitney v. California. 205 Justices Holmes and
Brandeis used the language of incitement and imminence of illegal
conduct while at the same time noting that the presence of these
conditions will be found by a fact-specific judicial inquiry and prior
restraint is justified where they are found. 206 Thus, although the Bran-
denburg standard, by word, employs the Holmes-Brandeis interpreta-
tion of the clear and present danger standard, courts applying Than-
denburg to various tort actions challenging speech have not considered
the nature or purpose of the standard—that is, that speech can. be re-
strained where it is evident that danger is likely and imminent. 207
Thus, by disallowing tort actions to lie for actual harm resulting from
speech and expressive conduct, courts have expanded the First
Amendment shield to speakers ill a manner unintended by Justices
Holmes and Brandeis. 2°8
indeed, the two types of speech recognized by courts in applying
Brandenburg—teaching or advocating the moral propriety of non-
specific illegal conduct on the one hand, and advocating that which is
intended and is likely to effect imminent illegal conduct on the
201 See Crump, supra note 14, at 51-52.
202 See, g Dennis V. United States, 341 U.S. 404,517 (1951); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357,372 (1927); Citlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,672 (1925); Schenck v United
States, 249 U.S. 47,53 (1919).
2" See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1069).
204 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51-53.
205 See Wining, 274 U.S. at. 372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlin°, 268 U.S. at 672-73
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
200 See. e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 360-67 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitiora 268 U.S. at.
672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
207 See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371-72; Gillow, 268 U.S. at 670-71; Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
200 See Whitney. 274 U.S. at 371-72; Gillow, 268 U.S. at 670-71; Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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other—merely represent the end points on a spectrum. Instead of
recognizing this, courts have segregated the universe of verbal and
written communication into two forms of speech: that which is di-
rected to and likely to produce imminent lawless conduct and that
which does not. 209
 The first of these forms is subject to prior restraint,
while the latter is not. 210 This compartmentalization is too simplistic;
as such, it provides an ineffective guide for evaluating schemes of
prior restraint and retrospective tort liability as applied to, for exam-
ple, advocacy of specific illegal conduct that has a high probability of
effectuating its intended impact but is lacking in a component of
temporal immediacy. 2" Moreover, modern courts have mistakenly ap-
plied the Brandenburg standard in other speech contexts where
speech-as-an-idea is virtually indistinguishable from speech-as-a-
product, such as with instruction manuals 212
 and recipe books. 2"
A. Erroneous Instruction—Analysis
This latter point is illustrated by erroneous instruction cases, for
example, where courts have denied liability based on strict products
liability or warranty of quality theories in part because the "product"
warrantied includes only the physical properties of the publication,
not the ideas contained therein that arguably cause tortious injury. 214
Indeed, the court in Cardozo v. True wrote that "ideas" hold a privi-
leged position in our society and those who distribute these ideas ful-
fill an essential function. 215
 Without citing any further support, how-
ever, the court concluded that to impose liability without fault on said
distributors would severely restrict the free flow of information.216
2°9 See, e.g., Brandenbuig, 395 U.S. at 44/3-49; lierceg v. Hustler Magazine, 814 F.2(1
1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1987).
21 ° See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
211 See generally Malloy, supra note 6; Day, supra note 118.
212 see, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (evaluating First
Amendment protection of pamphlet on how to hire a hit man).
213 See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (evaluating
First Amendment protection of book instructing on how to find and prepare mushrooms
for cutentinption).
214 See, e.g., Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056-57 (Fla. Dist.. Ct. App. 1977).
215 see id.
210 See id. This distinction is not unlike the idea/expression dichotomy propounded in
copyright law. Copyright protection is permitted on the particular expression of a work
(e.g., the original selection and arrangement of words in a book) but copyright protection
is not permitted on the ideas exhibited in a work (e.g., the theme of a novel). See Copy-
rights, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1996); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879). Its corollary
concept is that of merger; that is, where an idea can be expressed in a small and limited
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This argument is .nothing more than a smoke screen erected to ab-
solve a distributor of liability for the danger imposed by its products.
In cases such as these, the product is an instruction manual—the in-
structions "as ideas" are not severable from the product purchased. 217
Consider, for example, the dismissal of two claims against the
authors of a self-help book intended to help victims of child sexual
abuse. 218 The authors of "The Courage to Heal Workbook" were sued
by two readers who alleged that by following the advice in the book
they conjured false memories of child sexual abuse. 219 The plaintiffs
were charged with, inter alia, negligence and false advertising . 22° The
suits were dismissed with prejudice by the Superior Court of Califor-
nia. 221 It is anomalous that authorship of a self-help book does not
create a duty to the consuming public whereas direct therapy to an
individual consumer—where the same ideas and methods are used—
would inhere such a duty and for which a therapist could be liable
under a negligent advice standard. 222 The purpose of publishing and
distributing such instructional materials is that they be followed and
relied upon. Even if a duty to investigate the accuracy and veracity of
instructions would have a chilling effect on speech, the question re-
mains whether a mere warning issued to consumers to assist them in
protecting themselves would be likewise chilling. 223 This proposition,
however, has not won favor from courts considering the issue. 224 Of
number of ways, copyright will not protect the expression because extending such protec-
tion is the same as extending a monopoly to the idea itself. See Kregos v. Associated Press,
937 F.2d 700,707 (2d Cir. 1991). Like most concepts in law, however, the idea/expression
dichotomy is malleable. Courts have used this concept as a tool to either find or limit li-
ability of alleged infringers depending on the reasonableness of extending a monopoly to
the purported copyright holder. Compare Baker, 101 U.S. at 107 (holding that blank ac-
counting table not properly the subject of copyright insofar as table is one of few expres-
sions of idea of bookkeeping system, thus, merger applies) With Kregos, 937 F.2(I at 706-07
(upholding copyright in baseball prediction form based on pitcher statistics despite prob-
able application of merger doctrine because not as important. to prevent monopoly on
method of determining outcomes of baseball games as on method of diagnosing disease,
for example).
217 See Day, supra note 118, at 95-98.
218 See id. at 98.
215 See judge Throws Out Another Lawsuit Brought Against Authors of the Courage. to Heal,
BUSINESS WIRE, Sept. 29,1994.
229 See id,
221 See id.
222 See Day, supra note 118, at 98.
225 But see Crump, supra note 12, at 66-67 (noting that the inclusion of disclaimers
should absolve a speaker of liability in proportion to the prevalence, conspicuiry, the ten-
dency of the disclahner to warn of danger, and the intent of the speaker to so warn),
224 See Winter, 938 F.2d at 1036 n.6.
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course, the precise issue of whether such liability would flow to an
author propounding a work containing erroneous instructions re-
mains untested.
Furthermore, considering the merits of a strict products liability
analysis, the contention in True that the retailer would be indirectly
responsible to investigate the veracity of the contents of each of its
books is an unsatisfying justification for absolving it of liability. In-
deed, under a standard products liability theory, a retailer would be
liable. Most likely, the manufacturer, however, would ultimately be re-
sponsible derivatively for any fines levied against the retailer. 228
 Thus,
visiting liability upon a retailer would not impose a duty to investigate
upon it—any chilling effect would be the result of publishers censoring
publications that pose a potential danger to its audience. 226 As a re-
sult, erroneous instruction, and the needless harm resulting from re-
liance upon it, would be eliminated from the marketplace with mar-
ginal, if any, impact on the free flow of ideas or the diminution of
politically, artistically, or socially valuable speech. Filially, there is no
reason to conclude, as did the court in Winter, that a duty to investi-
gate is a necessary consequence of imposing liability on a publisher or
retailer.227 Instead, a simple disclaimer on the cover indicating that
the contents have not been rigorously tested for safety and veracity
would probably suffice to cure this informational defect in the prod-
uct. thereby bolstering the marketplace theory because the consumer
would be better educated and not duped under the guise of First
Amendment freedoms. 228 In the end, imposing the threat of liability
for erroneous instructive materials would promote greater accuracy
and responsibility on the part of publishers.
B. Dangerous Instruction—Analysis
With respect to dangerous instruction cases such as Herceg v. Hus-
tler Magazine, courts have held that in the absence of overt exhorta-
225 See RESTATEMENT (NIRO OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 1 (1998) ("One en-
gaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a
defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the de-
fect."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tom's § 88613 cult. c (1979) ("If a manufacturer sup-
plies a defective product to a retailer, who sells it to a customer, who recovers from the
retailer for an injury incurred, the retailer may recover in indemnity against the manufac-
turer or he may maintain an action in negligence or for strict products liability:).
226 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886 con. C (1979).
227 But see Muter, 9381±.24 at 1037.
228 See RESTATE:NIP:NT (TERRA)) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § I cut. a.
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don to action, such speech necessarily fails to constitute incitement
within the meaning of Brandenburg.229 The justifiability of this result in
the Herceg case is questionable because the actual and psychological
messages of the article conflict when put in context. The facts indicate
that the publisher prominently warned readers "at least ten different
times that the practice is dangerous, self-destructive and deadly" and
that readers should not attempt its practice. 23° This warning, however,
might not have been sufficient in inoculating the inherent dangers in
the article given the fact that it was placed within the context of a
masturbatory aid (Hustler magazine itself) and within a series of arti-
cles entitled "Sexplay" designed to "increase [readers'] sexual knowl-
edge, to lessen [their] inhibitions and—ultimately—to make [them]
much better lover[s]."231
Moreover, it may be the case that fourteen-year-old boys are not
capable of differentiating between the dangers exemplified in the
"pervasive" warnings and the enticing description of pleasure derived
from the practice. Had plaintiffs been permitted to examine this as-
pect at trial, they might have shown that Hustler was grossly negligent
in publishing an article that it knew, or reasonably should have
known, would fall into the hands of adolescents not able to appreciate
the dangers of this practice, given its enticing context, regardless of
the warnings. Furthermore, the court did not consider the motiva-
tions of the publisher in distributing this article—i.e., whether it was
indeed meant for "educational purposes" only, whether Hustler in-
tended people to perform this act, or whether Hustler knew or rea-
sonably should have known that people would do so. 232 Such findings
of fact would have been helpful in calibrating the culpability of the
publisher in publishing instructions on how to perform this inher-
ently dangerous activity. 23°
The Fifth Circuit's contention in Herceg that the instruction com-
ponent of the article cannot be the sole basis for liability is somewhat
compelling. After all, to know what auto-erotic asphyxiation is is to
know roughly how to perform 4. 234 However, the court also seems
229 See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1022-23.
234) See id. at 1019.
251 Id. at 1018.
212 See id. at 1018-25.
"3 Admittedly, under this analysis, Mader might be strictly liable for all tortious injury
resulting from their instructional article. Given the nature of the publication and context
of the article, there may be no way to effectively warn the reader of the dangers of auto-
erotic asphyxiation.
254 See 814 F.2d at 1023
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afraid to adopt a standard less protective of speech than Brandenburg
because application of such a standard would be inherently more
complex.255 This position is illegitimate because the court does not
explain how such an analysis would differ from standard negligence
evaluation of speech falling within unprotected speech categories
such as defamation, libel, and fighting words.236
As distinct from the erroneous instruction cases, investigation
into the intent of the speaker is necessary to find liability in danger-
ous instruction cases. Thus, like active encouragement cases, dis-
cussed below, where the speaker intends harmful or illegal action to
ensue from his work, the fact that he does not use the language of
direct incitement should not inoculate him from liability. 237 Further-
more, in considering such cases, courts should evaluate the likelihood
that the intended or inevitable audience might act on dangerous in-
structions, and the fact that such action has indeed taken place and
caused injury. 238 When such speech is thus intended to incite lawless
or dangerous conduct, immediately or at some future time, and that
conduct actually occurs, the speaker should be answerable for the
known, probable, or intended ramifications of his speech. 259
 Ulti-
mately, liability would result in greater responsibility in publishing
dangerous materials; and by permitting investigation' into the inten-
tions of the speakers, only such dangerous speech as is promulgated
by those with pernicious, reckless, or foul intentions would be elimi-
nated from the marketplace.
C. Active Encouragement and Facilitation—Analysis
Active encouragement is perhaps the most noxious form of
speech arguably still protected by the First Amendment. It is so closely
intertwined with action that although it does not fit within the current
construct set forth by the Court in Brandenburg, it nonetheless does
not warrant any First Amendment protection. Indeed, rather than
referring to Brandenburg, Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. should serve as
the guide to examining exhortative speech. 24° It is simply irrelevant
that the exhortation occurs through a medium, such as publication or
broadcast, where its attenuation does not serve to change the charac-
2" See id at 1024.
236 See Day, SUM note 118, at 84-85.
237 See Crtunp, supra note 12, at 55-56.
238 See id. at 57-63.
239 Bu t see
 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
219 See 539 P.24 36, 48 (Cal. 1975).
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ter of the speech. 241 Mill's highly fancied quote noted above,242 is of_
ten invoked to amplify the argument that publication is less danger-
ous than direct verbal exhortation. 243 This passage is more correctly
read as standing for the proposition that the denunciation of a politi-
cal or social regime in the abstract is fundamentally different in char-
acter than advocacy and instruction of specific illegal conduct; in fact,
this passage is meant to be descriptive of how conduct and speech can
he either distinct or commingled, and thus, censorship of action-like
speech is justified despite the de facto infringement on liberty. 244 It is
permissible, therefore, to advocate the legality of murder or lobby for
the abolition of age of consent laws, but advocating and explicitly in-
structing on the manner in which to avoid or pervert the law justifia-
bly opens one up to liability. If one feels just in advocating the abroga-
tion of the law, then let the just man martyr himself and pay for the
injury he causes either in prison or in pecuniary penalties. Such is the
price for civil disobedience.
Moreover, although generally speaking the written word is less
likely to promote immediate action than the verbal word spoken to
those acutely receptive to the advocacy, written communication may
nonetheless carry the same impact. If, for example, the audience of a
publication is peculiarly receptive to the ideas contained within that
publication and are poised to act on those ideas, it is reasonable to
assume that written exhortation will result in action in accordance
with the ideas set forth in much the same way verbal exhortation
would if it were transmitted to an equally poised crowd.245 Thus, it
might not have been inappropriate to hold Hustler liable for the acci-
dental asphyxiation of the young boy where the known audience of
such a publication was poised to behave in a risque sexual manner
and the publication made auto-erotic asphyxiation seductively ta-
boo.246
The Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc. form of facilitation, publishing
an instructional guide on how to become a hit-man, represents the
nexus of specific intent to injure and incitement or exhortation to
241 See
242 See MILL., supra note 17, at 53.
213 &e, e.g., Herreg. 814 F.2d at 1018-19,1023.
211 See MILL, supra note 17. at 53.
215 See id.
216 See Herreg, 814 F.2d at 1025.
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dangerous or illegal conduct.247
 Advocacy of criminal conduct should
not be permitted under the First Amendment merely because of the
belief that where there is time to combat bad speech with good
speech the bad speech must not be subject to censorship. 248 To so
conclude is to ignore the fact that this type of speech is itself injurious
because no amount of combative speech can remove its impact once
it is injected in the marketplace.
With respect to facilitation and inspiration cases in general,
again, evaluating the intent of the speaker should be considered in
determining whether the First Amendment should impose a barrier
to tort liability. 249
 For example, publishing advertisements that the
publisher has reason to believe are matching up criminal conspirators
and deliberately turning a blind eye to this consequence, is tanta-
mount to aiding and abetting the commission of criminal conduct. 25°
As Professor Terri Day noted, even the Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Maga-
zine, Inc. standard—imposing liability on publishers only where adver-
tisements contain "a clearly identifiable unreasonable risk, that the
offer in the ad is one to commit a serious violent crime" 251—is too lib-
eral in its treatment of negligent publication suits in light of First
Amendment principles and is thus unnecessarily protective of pub-
lishers. 252
Furthermore, it is of particular importance in inspiration cases to
assess whether the speech is or is intended to be of serious artistic,
political, social, or scientific_ value—in other words, its value in the
marketplace of ideas. 255 The presence of these qualities should weigh
heavily in favor of First Amendment protection given the lack of di-
rect exhortation or, intent to exhort dangerous or illegal action as
217 110WeVer, it arguably lacks the immediacy element required by Brandenburg: See Rice,
128 F.2d at '267.
215 q Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify
repression.") (emphasis added).
2'5 See Crump, supra note 12, at 63-65.
25° See Rice, 128 F.3d at 242-43.
oi 968 F.2d I 110,1118 (11th Cir. 1992).
252 See Day, supra note 118. at 91. Professor Day first noted that "clearly illegal adver-
tisements" are not protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 104-05. Second, imposing
liability for publishing ambiguous ads that lead to injury would only require publishers to
reject or edit those ads. See id. at 91. Because this is already part of the publication process,
Professor Day argued that holding publishers to this standard would impose no additional
burden. See id. at 91.
253 Crump, supra note 12, at 67-69; see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24.
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well as the improbability of such actions inspired by such speech—af-
ter all, it is this type of speech that lies at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection, 254 Under such an analysis, "2Pacalypse
Now" would properly be understood as artistic expression, not an at-
tempt to hypnotize listeners into somnambulistic, murderous con-
duct,255 not advocating illegal or dangerous conduct,256 not giving its
audience the means to execute such conduct, 257 and not the solicita-
tion of imitation.258
CONCLUSION
The propriety of immunizing speakers from the tortious affects
of their speech is questionable, Surely the First Amendment poses an
immense barrier to any scheme of restraint, even if the only restrain-
ing force is promoting self-censorship and responsibility in publica-
tion. The Brandenburg standard is ill-suited, however, to evaluate in-
stances where speech is. recklessly, negligently, or intentionally
promulgated and postured so as to cause actual harm. Indeed, the
Brandenburg standard was designed to protect speakers whose speech
was thought to pose danger, but whose danger had not yet mani-
fested. This Note has examined a variety of cases in which harm has
manifested and yet reckless, negligent, or malicious publication went
unrestrained because the Supreme Court has not established a dis-
tinct standard for what are clearly distinct cases, Just as the Court did
with the Brandenburg case, it may be time for the Court to depart from
decades of precedent and reevaluate the merits of applying Branden-
burg to claims of tortious injury arising from dangerous, erroneous,
exhortative, or facilitating speech.
ARIELLE D. KANE
251 See Crump, supra note 12, at 67-69; see also United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
212 (2d. Cir. 1950).
255 See Vance v. Judas Priest, 1990 WL 130920, at *4 (Nev. Dist.. Ct., Aug. 24, 1990). In-
terestingly, the Second Judicial District for the District Court of Nevada had occasion to
adjudicate the liability of a music artist whose music was found to contain hypnotizing,
subliminal messages. In 1990, in Iimee a Judas Priest, the court held that the a music label
could not be held liable for inadvertently constructed subliminal messages. See id. al *21-
2`2. In 1.41w, plaintiffs claimed that itulas Priest's nntsic alleged to exhort the suicides of
two young men. See id. at *21-22. The court concluded, as a general matter, that
subliminal messages are not protected by the umbrella of the First Amendment. See id. at
*23. Nonetheless, the court denied liability because it found that the messages present in
the music were actually inadvertent sound effects. Siv id. at *9-10.
258 See Brandenbmg, 395 U.S. at 447.
257 See Rice, l28 F.3c1 at 242.
258 See Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
